Barry Rubin on Iran

Lately Barry Rubin has been my favorite (non-Objectivist) political analyst. For a good example of why I thoroughly enjoy his analysis, see his blog entry on Iran in which he compares Iran to Stalinist Russia. Here's an educational excerpt:

The post-election trials of opposition activists in Tehran resemble the Soviet purge trials of the 1930s. They are one more sign that Iran is entering a new era, but one that is the exact opposite of the idea that the conflict over stolen elections will weaken the regime or lead to more active dissent.

Up to now, the regime has generally operated—or at least pretended to do so--on what in Iran is called the “Islamic Republican” philosophy which allowed a real margin of freedom. This is a combination of popular sovereignty and Islamism. The people were allowed to vote for candidates deemed to support the revolution. At times, the balloting was more honest; at times less.

Read the whole thing!

Iraq: In Search of Unity

I finally got a chance to listen to Scott Powell's latest Islamist Entanglement lecture which focused on Iraq. The key to understanding Iraq seems to be that for most of history there was no such thing. Unlike Egypt or Iran, Iraq does not have a unifying history, race, or even religion. For much of its recent history the area now occupied by the state of Iraq was made up of three separate provinces within the Ottoman Empire. No modern Iraqis identify with the ancient empires that used to occupy parts of what used to be called Mesopotamia. The Iraqi population is made up of Arabs in the center and south of Iraq and Kurds in the north. Like Iran, the Shiites represent a majority of the Iraqi population; however, unlike Iran there is substantial minority of Sunnis. Thus, the only basis for the existence of an Iraqi political entity are the imperial machinations of the Western powers after World War I, in particular Great Britain. For a while, Iraqis were able to unite somewhat around enmity toward the West. However, after independence, such unity was only possible to be maintained with the brute force of dictatorships. The Iraqi history and background does not lead to optimism with respect to the present attempt to create a united, democratic Iraq by the United States, particularly after the departure of US troops.

Iran

Scott Powell's Islamist Entanglement lectures (also available as individual lectures) help set the historical context for an understanding of the Middle East and last week's lecture on Iran was no different. Beginning briefly with ancient Persia, Scott traces the development what became Iran as part of the various Islamic empires. Important in this regard is that most of Iran, unlike much of the rest of the Muslim world, is Shia. Its religion has thus always put it somewhat at odds with the rest of the Muslim world. After the usual confrontations with the West, Iran began to modernize a little and by the early 20th century some of its intellectuals were attempting to enact constitutional reforms. Unfortunately those reforms failed. Iran has a long history of having an alliance between a military and the religious leadership. The leader is supposed to follow the sacred path and if he does not he deserves to be overthrown. When the leader starts to endorse Western ideas, that is usually when he is regarded as having betrayed his office. Ultimately this is what happened to the American-supported Shah in 1979. Also of note is that Scott presents a somewhat different perspective on the whole Mossadegh-CIA affair of 1953. All in all, this is a highly recommended lecture.

Glick on Obama & Clinton

Caroline Glick has another good essay in the Jerusalem Post comparing Clinton and Obama. My favorite passage is the following:

THERE ARE two reasons that a deterrence model will be as ineffective in curbing Iranian aggression as Obama's appeasement model. First, as last week's 25th anniversary of the Iranian-sponsored bombing of the US embassy in Beirut recalled, Iran has been attacking the US and its allies both directly and through proxies since 1979. To date, not only has the US failed to deter such attacks, it has never made Iran pay a price for them. With this abysmal track record against a non-nuclear Iran, it is hard to see how the US can threaten a nuclear-armed Iran with sufficient credibility to make a deterrence-based strategy successful.

The second reason that basing US policy towards Iran on a deterrence model will likely fail is because Iran's leadership has made clear that is not necessarily concerned about the survivability of Iran. From Ayatollah Khomeini to Ayatollah Khamenei to Ali Rafsanjani to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran's leadership has made clear that they are not Iranian patriots but global Islamic revolutionaries. Given their millenarian, apocalyptic view of their country's purpose in world affairs, there is good reason to believe that a strategy based on some form of mutually assured destruction would have only marginal impact on Iran's decision-makers.[emphasis added]

Why Ahmadinejad is smiling...

As usual, Caroline Glick has some of the best analysis of what to make of recent events in the Middle East. Here are a few exerpts:

And the fact is that the Sunni states are aligned with most of Iran's policies. They keep Iraq at arm's length and loudly criticize US operations in the country. They continue to back Hamas and ostracize Israel. And they have taken no substantive stands against Hizbullah's subversion of the Saniora government since the end of the Second Lebanon War.

The main reason that the Sunni Arab countries cannot contend with Iran is that their publics share Iran's jihadist ideology. And their publics share Iran's general jihadist ideology because the Sunni states have indoctrinated their publics to believe in jihad through their state-controlled media.

Egypt, Saudi Arabia and their Sunni Arab brothers are in no position to argue with Iran publicly or to confront Iran's Arab proxies because they can't explain to their own people why Iran's bid to destroy Israel and to dominate the world in the name of Islam is a bad thing.

However, to get the full context of how we got to this point, I recommend Scott Powell's Islamist Entanglement lectures which are available both as a set and as individual lectures. Sign up now!

General Petraeus on Iranian Acts of War in Iraq

"Acts of war" is my description but how else should one interpret what Iran is doing. From Gen Petraeus opening remarks to the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing (all emphasis below added):

...Recently, of course, some militia elements became active again. Though a Sadr stand-down resolved the situation to a degree, the flare-up also highlighted the destructive role Iran has played in funding, training, arming and directing the so-called special groups, and generated renewed concern about Iran in the minds of many Iraqi leaders. Unchecked, the special groups pose the greatest long-term threat to the viability of a democratic Iraq.
...
Actions by neighboring states compound Iraq's challenges. Syria has taken some steps to reduce the flow of foreign fighters through its territory, but not enough to shut down the key network that supports Al Qaida-Iraq. And Iran has fueled the violence, as I noted, in a particularly damaging way through its lethal support to the special groups.
...
Together with the Iraqi security forces we have also focused on the special groups. These elements are funded, trained, armed and directed by Iran's Quds Force with help from Lebanese Hezbollah. It was these groups that launched Iranian rockets and mortar rounds at Iraq's seat of government two weeks ago, causing loss of innocent life and fear in the capital, and requiring Iraqi and coalition actions in response.

Ahmadinajad's visit to Iraq -- a different view

Writing in Frontpage Magazine, Amir Taheri presents a rather different view of Ahmadinajad's visit to Iraq, than Robert Scheer of The Nation described.

Weeks of hard work by Iranian emissaries and pro-Iran elements in Iraq were supposed to ensure massive crowds thronging the streets of Baghdad and throwing flowers on the path of the visiting Iranian leader. Instead, no more than a handful of Iraqis turned up for the occasion. The numbers were so low that the state-owned TV channels in Iran decided not to use the footage at all.

Instead, much larger crowds gathered to protest Ahmadinejad's visit. In the Adhamiya district of Baghdad, several thousand poured into the streets with cries of "Iranian aggressor, go home!"

There may have been protests but it seems that unlike American officials visiting Iraq, Ahmadinejad was still somewhat more secure. Taheri also wrote that:

Ahmadinejad had come to Iraq to show it was an Iranian playground. He ended up by showing that Iran's influence in Iraq is widely exaggerated.

Admittedly, perhaps Iran does not have outright control of Iraq. However, Taheri admits that:

To be sure, Tehran exerts influence through a number of Shiite militias it has recruited, trained and financed for years. And some insurgent groups depend on Iran as their main source of weapons, especially sophisticated explosive devices. Iran also remains Iraq's biggest trading partner and the second-biggest investor in the Iraqi economy. Iranian pilgrims account for more than 90 percent of all foreign visitors in Iraq.

I supported the overthrow of Saddam Hussein as his apparent weapons of mass destruction combined with his links to terrorists appeared to pose an rather ominous threat in the aftermath of 9/11. However, Iran remains the number one state sponsor of terrorism and it seems to me that the fact that Iraq is willing to be friendly to Iran while Iran is actively killing both our people and Iraqis still seems to me rather bizarre. The fundamental problem, I think, remains the fact that despite 30 years of provocations, we are unwilling to confront Iran directly, which leaves it free to continue to challenge us.

Agreeing with The Nation

I find myself in the uncomfortable position of finding more and more articles on the left quite reasonable, at least in some of the major points they raise with respect to Iraq. In a column entitled Iraq's Iranian Lovefest, Robert Scheer points out the obvious that many seem to have missed:

Are the media dumb or just out to lunch? Sorry to be intemperate, but how else can one explain the meager attention paid to the truly historic visit of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Iraq? Not only is he the first Mideast head of state to visit the country since its alleged liberation, but the very warm official welcome offered by the Iraqi government to the most vociferous critic of the United States speaks volumes to the abject failure of the Bush doctrine.

He is of course quite right. He asks "...what leverage does the United States have over Iran when, as the image of Ahmadinejad holding hands with the top leaders of Iraq demonstrated to the world, we have put the disciples of the Iranian ayatollahs in power in Baghdad?" A reasonable question. This goes back to the Bush administration's pushing for democratic elections which given the nature of the Iraqi people brought to power precisely the kinds of people we ought to be opposing.

Scheer's next point is particularly instructive:

How interesting that Ahmadinejad, unlike a US President who has to be airlifted unannounced into ultra-secure bases, was able to convoy in from the airport in broad daylight on a road that US dignitaries fear to travel. His love fest with Iraq President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd who fought on Iran's side against Iraq and who speaks Farsi, even took place outside of the safety of the Green Zone, adding emphasis to Ahmadinejad's claim that while he is welcome in Iraq, the Americans are not.

Ahmadinejad's confidence in his safety could mean one of two things: Either he assumes his enemies are too afraid of the consequences of an attempt on his life, or he doesn't really have any enemies among the various insurgent groups since, as has been documented, Iran has helped them with supplies and training. I suspect these are non-exclusive alternatives, i.e., both are true. Much like the Soviets during the Cold War, very few incidents of terrorism occurred which involved Russian or Soviet personnel as victims both because most terrorists were Soviet sponsored and in the few exceptional cases in which Russians were the victims of terrorists, the Soviet response was immediate and harsh so that there was no mistake as who would terrorize whom.

Scheer continues:

Saddam Hussein went to war with Iran, but George W. Bush has given his Iranian foes a Shiite-run ally. Iran is now a major trading partner of Iraq that has offered a $1 billion loan, the border is increasingly porous as religious pilgrimages have become the norm, and many investment projects supervised by Iranians are in the works. Instead of isolating the "rogue regime" of Iran, the Bush Administration has catapulted the theocrats of Tehran into the center of Mideast political power.

Well put. Of course, I do disagree with Scheer about one thing. He argues that as a result of the Bush administration incompetence, "peace" requires the "cooperation of the ayatollahs of Iran," I would say we should first and foremost be interested in victory, and only subsequently a real peace.

Around the web...

• Caroline Glick has written another excellent column reviewing a recent AEI report on Iran's activities in the Middle East. She writes:

  IN AN attempt to break through the post-Iraq invasion compartmentalization of Western discourse on Iran, the American Enterprise Institute published a 68-page report last week that sets out Iran's actions in Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, Iraq and Afghanistan. Authored by Frederick Kagan, Kimberly Kagan and Danielle Pletka, the report, "Iranian Influence in the Levant, Iraq and Afghanistan," shows in copiously documented detail how Iran is strengthening its regional posture at the West's expense not only through military actions but also through economic, cultural and infrastructure projects that build bilateral and multilateral relationships with states and terror groups based on dependency on Teheran.

• Scott Powell has posted the second part of his fascinating series on intellectual trends in Europe called Europism: Collectivism’s Failure and the Resentment of America.
• Alexander Marriot posts an anecdote from his graduate school experiences that illustrates the remaining loyalty to socialism (and its moral basis altruism) and its relation to slavery:

  ...it means quite unequivocally that socialists are the only ones who make a moral case against slavery as a labor system. When I queried in class if it were possible for a capitalist to morally condemn slavery I was told quite simply, "No." The only thing which comforted me in this moment was the fact that I was not the only one in the room insulted by this remark, in fact the sense of shock was quite palpable.

• A combination of David Brooks and Robert Scheer make the case of why I will not vote for John McCain. Let's take the Nation's Scheer first:
  

  ...the 1996 legislation, although you would never have learned this from the mainstream media at the time, opened the floodgates for massive media consolidation, thus rewarding media moguls for their many millions in campaign contributions. McCain was a big player on that Commerce Committee at the time, and I expected a Times revelation as to just how Iseman got McCain to help gift the media barons with their dream legislation.
  
  The revelation never came, because the annoying reality is that McCain was one of the rare Senate opponents of the telecom bill that Iseman was pushing--as opposed to the New York Times, which, like every other major media outlet pushed for the legislation (in the case of the Times, without ever conceding its own corporation's financial bias in the matter). McCain was one of five senators (and the sole Republican) who, along with Democrats Russ Feingold, Patrick Leahy, Paul Simon and the great Paul Wellstone, who voted against the atrocious legislation, which President Bill Clinton signed into law.

  I'm sorry but I think legislation that removes barriers for companies to merge is something to be supported not opposed. Brooks mentions McCain's opposition to the above law as well as his support for some others. Examples:
  

  In 1998, McCain championed anti-smoking legislation that faced furious opposition from the tobacco lobby. McCain guided the legislation through the Senate Commerce Committee on a 19-1 vote, but then the tobacco companies struck back. They hired 200 lobbyists and spent $40 million in advertising (three times as much as the Harry and Louise health care reform ads). Many of the ads attacked McCain by name, accusing him of becoming a big government liberal. After weeks of bitter debate, the bill died on the Senate floor.

  and
  

  In 2003, the Senate nearly passed the McCain-Lieberman Climate Stewardship Act. The act was opposed by the usual mix of energy, auto and mining companies. But moderate environmental groups were thrilled that McCain-Lieberman was able to attract more than 40 votes in the Senate.

  In all fairness to McCain, Brooks also mentions McCain's opposition to agricultural subsidies, a position I support but I'm afraid the negatives (particularly support for campaign finance legislation, which Brooks also mentions) here overrule any positives.
  

State of the War

A useful survey of the condition of the various war theaters, written by noted journalist Bill Roggio, can be found here. The survey begins with this paragraph:

The US and her allies in Europe, the Middle East, and beyond have witnessed both stunning successes and dramatic setbacks in the Long War during 2007. Pakistan has continued its slide towards a failed state, with the government having relinquished control over additional territory to the Taliban and, thus, al Qaeda. Suicide bombings and attacks on all segments of the state plagued Pakistan as the Taliban and al Qaeda cemented their new safe havens. Iraq, which seemed all but lost at the end of 2006 as the US appeared to lose the all-important political will, has turned around with the change in counterinsurgency plan and the surge of troops US and Iraqi troops. Al Qaeda and the Iranian-backed Shia terrorists are losing ground and local support in Iraq. Afghanistan has seen its worst year of violence since the Taliban was defeated in late 2001; suicide bombings and IED attacks skyrocketed due to the problems in Pakistan.

Read the whole thing; it's quite instructive. I'm still of the opinion that if we had taken this conflict a lot more seriously to begin with, along the lines described by John David Lewis here, we would have wrapped it up a long time ago.

Krugman the Ostrich

Paul Krugman, NY Times columnist and previously noted mostly for his economic ignorance has in a new op-ed piece called Fearing Fear Itself demonstated his ignorance of foreign policy and national security.

Krugman is upset that Rudy Giuliani has advisers that do not seek to appease Iran:

Consider, for a moment, the implications of the fact that Rudy Giuliani is taking foreign policy advice from Norman Podhoretz, who wants us to start bombing Iran “as soon as it is logistically possible.”

Mr. Podhoretz, the editor of Commentary and a founding neoconservative, tells us that Iran is the “main center of the Islamofascist ideology against which we have been fighting since 9/11.” The Islamofascists, he tells us, are well on their way toward creating a world “shaped by their will and tailored to their wishes.” Indeed, “Already, some observers are warning that by the end of the 21st century the whole of Europe will be transformed into a place to which they give the name Eurabia.”

Do I have to point out that none of this makes a bit of sense?

Actually, it makes every bit of sense, at least for those willing to look at the facts. Let's see if we can answer some of Krugman's objections. First:

For one thing, there isn’t actually any such thing as Islamofascism — it’s not an ideology; it’s a figment of the neocon imagination.

Well, I thought in this case Christopher Hitchens, hardly a neocon, put it best:

Does Bin Ladenism or Salafism or whatever we agree to call it have anything in common with fascism?

I think yes. The most obvious points of comparison would be these: Both movements are based on a cult of murderous violence that exalts death and destruction and despises the life of the mind. ("Death to the intellect! Long live death!" as Gen. Francisco Franco's sidekick Gonzalo Queipo de Llano so pithily phrased it.) Both are hostile to modernity (except when it comes to the pursuit of weapons), and both are bitterly nostalgic for past empires and lost glories. Both are obsessed with real and imagined "humiliations" and thirsty for revenge. Both are chronically infected with the toxin of anti-Jewish paranoia (interestingly, also, with its milder cousin, anti-Freemason paranoia). Both are inclined to leader worship and to the exclusive stress on the power of one great book. Both have a strong commitment to sexual repression—especially to the repression of any sexual "deviance"—and to its counterparts the subordination of the female and contempt for the feminine. Both despise art and literature as symptoms of degeneracy and decadence; both burn books and destroy museums and treasures.

I think I am personally okay with any of the following terms: Islamism, Islamofascism, Radical Islam, Jihadism, etc. The key is that a certain version of Islam is the guiding force of our enemies. I don't know that Islam has to be interpreted in such a way that it leads to conflict with the West. I happen to know some self-declared Muslims who seem no more threatening than the average Western Christians. But at this point it really is up to Muslims and particularly their leadership to demonstrate otherwise.

Krugman continues:

And Iran had nothing whatsoever to do with 9/11 — in fact, the Iranian regime was quite helpful to the United States when it went after Al Qaeda and its Taliban allies in Afghanistan.

To gain a good understanding of Iran's relationship to Al Qaeda, as well as how hostile it has been to the United States over the last 29 year, I recommend Thomas Jocelyn's excellent report on Iran's Proxy War Against America as well as the 9-11 Commission Report. Well, did Iran have anything to do with 9/11?

Intelligence indicates the persistence of contacts between Iranian security officials and senior al Qaeda figures after Bin Ladin’s return to Afghanistan. Khallad has said that Iran made a concerted effort to strengthen relations with al Qaeda after the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole, but was rebuffed because Bin Ladin did not want to alienate his supporters in Saudi Arabia.Khallad and other detainees have described the willingness of Iranian officials to facilitate the travel of al Qaeda members through Iran, on their way to and from Afghanistan.For example, Iranian border inspectors would be told not to place telltale stamps in the passports of these travelers. Such arrangements were particularly beneficial to Saudi members of al Qaeda.

Our knowledge of the international travels of the al Qaeda operatives selected for the 9/11 operation remains fragmentary. But we now have evidence suggesting that 8 to 10 of the 14 Saudi “muscle” operatives traveled into or out of Iran between October 2000 and February 2001. [p. 258, 9/11 Commission Full Report]

I guess the aiding and abetting of terrorists does not count as having anything to do with the operation. What is it with the Left and it's inability to accept the fact that we are at war with Iran? Apparently we need to review the list of assaults by Iran and Iranian sponsored organizations on the West. Such a list can be found in Jocelyn's Report on page 74 in the appendix.

November 4, 1979
Fifty-two American citizens are taken hostage by “students” loyal
to Ayatollah Khomeini. They are held for more than a year, until
January 20, 1981. The kidnappings are part of the Iranian revolution,
which serves as a model for Sunni terrorist groups like Ayman
al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad.
April 18, 1983
Iran’s master terrorist, Imad Mugniyah, orchestrates the first significant
Islamist suicide attack against America: the bombing of
the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. Establishing a modus operandi for
terrorists in the years to come, the attacker utilizes a van packed
with explosives.
October 23, 1983
Using massive truck bombs, Hezbollah’s suicide bombers simultaneously
attack the U.S. Marine Barracks and a housing complex
for French Paratroopers in Beirut, Lebanon. Al-Qaeda would later
adopt simultaneous suicide bombings as its preferred method for
committing attacks.
December 12, 1983
Iranian-backed terrorists bomb the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait. A
close relative of Imad Mugniyah is convicted by a Kuwaiti court
and sentenced to death for his role in the bombing. Other attackers,
also supported by Iran, are imprisoned. The terrorists come to
be known as the “Kuwait 17” or “Dawa 17.”
iran’s proxy war against america 75
March 16, 1984
William Buckley, the CIA’s station chief in Beirut, is kidnapped
and later tortured-to-death by Imad Mugniyah’s Hezbollah. Buckley’s
kidnapping is one in a series of Hezbollah’s kidnappings from
the early 1980s through the early 1990s. Dozens of Americans are
kidnapped and Hezbollah frequently demands an exchange for
the Kuwait 17. Hezbollah’s kidnappings lead to the biggest scandal
of President Ronald Reagan’s tenure, the Iran-Contra affair,
after the Reagan administration agrees to exchange arms for the
hostages.
September 20, 1984
Hezbollah terrorists strike the U.S. Embassy annex in Beirut with
a truck bomb.
December 3, 1984
Mugniyah’s operatives hijack Kuwait Airways Flight 221. The hijackers
attempt to barter for the release of the Kuwait 17.
June 14, 1985
Mugniyah’s terrorists hijack TWA Flight 847. Once again, the
hijackers attempt to barter for the release of the Kuwait 17. When
the hijackers’ demands are denied, they beat and kill a U.S. Navy
serviceman, Robert Dean Stethem, who happened to be on the
flight. Incredibly, Germany granted parole to one of the hijackers
in December 2005.
1990
According to Ali Mohamed, a top al-Qaeda operative in U.S. custody,
Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad partners with
Iran in a planned coup attempt in Egypt. Tehran trains EIJ terrorists
for the coup attempt, which is ultimately aborted. Iran also
pays al-Zawahiri $2 million for sensitive information concerning
the Egyptian Government’s plans to raid several islands in the Persian
Gulf.
1991
Iran and Sudan, then the world’s only Sunni Islamist states,
forge a strategic alliance. They begin to jointly export terrorism
throughout the world.
April 1991
Hassan al-Turabi hosts the first Popular Arab Islamic Conference
in Sudan. The conference provides a forum for disparate forces in
the Middle East who oppose American presence in the region to
come together. Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, Iraqi and Iranian representatives
all attend the meeting.
February 26, 1993
Terrorists connected to al-Qaeda and the global terror network
bomb the World Trade Center using a rental truck packed with
explosives. The bombers’ colleagues plot a follow-on attack
against landmarks in the NYC area. There is no known evidence
that Iran had a hand in these events. It is clear, however,
that several of the plotters had ties to Hassan al-Turabi’s Sudan.
Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, the spiritual leader of the two
leading Egyptian terrorist groups (both of which will join al-
Qaeda) and who was living in the New York metropolitan area,
is later convicted for his involvement in the attacks. Reports
surface that he and his organization received financial assistance
from Iran.
1993
According to Ali Mohamed, Imad Mugniyah and Osama bin
Laden meet in Sudan. Bin Laden expresses his desire to model al-
Qaeda after Hezbollah. In particular, bin Laden expresses interest
in Mugniyah’s bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in 1983
iran’s proxy war against america 77
and similar attacks. They agree to work together against America
and the West.
1993
According to Jamal al-Fadl, an al-Qaeda operative in U.S. custody,
bin Laden meets a leading Iranian sheikh in Sudan. The purpose
of the meeting is to put aside any differences between their
competing brands of Islam in order to come together against their
common enemy: the West. The meeting is just the first of several
between bin Laden and Iran’s spiritual leaders.
1993
Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps train al-
Qaeda’s terrorists in camps in Sudan, Lebanon and Iran. Among
the terrorists trained are some of bin Laden’s most trusted lieutenants
and al-Qaeda’s future leaders.
1993
Egypt and Algeria cut off diplomatic ties with Iran. Both nations
accuse Iran and Sudan of supporting Sunni terrorism, including
terrorist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda. Egypt will blame Iran
for supporting both the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic
Group throughout the 1990’s.
November 13, 1995
Two bombs are detonated, nearly simultaneously, at the Saudi National
Guard training facility in Riyadh, killing five Americans. The
suspects are captured and confess to being inspired by Osama bin
Laden. Bin Laden denies responsibility, but praises the attack. It is
likely al-Qaeda’s first terrorist attack inside the Saudi Kingdom.
November 19, 1995
An al-Qaeda suicide bomber destroys the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad,
Pakistan. The CIA’s Bob Baer later learns that Mugniyah’s
deputy assisted al-Qaeda in the attack and that one of bin Laden’s
top terrorists remained in contact with Mugniyah’s office months
afterwards.
May 1996
Bin Laden is expelled from Sudan, but the 9/11 Commission
reports that “intelligence indicates the persistance of contacts”
between al-Qaeda and Iran even after al-Qaeda’s relocation to Afghanistan.
Bin Laden and al-Qaeda maintain an ongoing presence
in Sudan, despite not being “formally” welcome.
June 21 - 23, 1996
Tehran hosts a summit for the leading Sunni and Shiite terrorist
groups. It is announced that the terrorists will continue to focus
on U.S. interests thoughout the region. Mugniyah, bin Laden,
and a leading member of the EIJ reportedly forge the “Committee
of Three,” under the leadership of Iran’s intelligence chief, to
focus their joint efforts against American targets.
June 25, 1996
Hezbollah terrorists, operating under the direction of senior
Iranian officials, bomb the Khobar Towers apartment complex
in Saudi Arabia. Contemporaneous reports by both the State
Department and the CIA note that al-Qaeda is also suspected of
playing a role. The 9/11 Commission would later find “indirect
evidence” of al-Qaeda’s involvement. The evidence includes intelligence
indicating that al-Qaeda was planning a similar operation
in the months prior and that bin Laden was congratulated by
other al-Qaeda operatives, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, shortly
after the attack.
iran’s proxy war against america 79
July 1996
According to Bob Baer, the Egyptian Islamic Group—an ally of
bin Laden’s al-Qaeda—is in contact with Mugniyah.
1996
According to Bob Baer, there is “incontrovertible evidence” of a
meeting between bin Laden and a representative of the Iranian
Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).
August 7, 1998
Al-Qaeda’s suicide bombers simultaneously destroy the U.S. Embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania. It is al-Qaeda’s most spectacular
attack prior to 9/11. The attack is clearly modeled on Hezbollah’s
attacks in the early 1980s. Indeed, the al-Qaeda terrorists responsible
were trained by Hezbollah in the early 1990s. There is evidence
that Iran also provided explosives used in the attack.
October - November 2000
Imad Mugniyah and his lieutenants personally escort several of
the 9/11 muscle hijackers out of Saudi Arabia on flights to Beirut
and Iran. In all, eight to ten of the hijackers travel through Iran
on the way to 9/11.
December 2000
Ramzi Binalshibh, al-Qaeda’s key point man for the 9/11 plot,
applies for visa at the Iranian Embassy in Berlin. His visa application
is approved.
January 31, 2001
Ramzi Binalshibh arrives at Tehran International airport. He does
not return to Germany until February 28, 2001. The purpose of
his trip to Iran remains a mystery. The 9/11 Commission does not
mention Binalshibh’s trip to Iran.
Early September 2001
Binalshibh flees to Iran shortly before the 9/11 attacks.
September 11, 2001
Nineteen al-Qaeda hijackers execute al-Qaeda’s largest operation
to date, killing nearly 3000 Americans. Many of the details surrounding
the plot, including who financed the attack, remain a
mystery.
October 2001
According to a high-level Taliban detainee at Gitmo, Iran offers
the Taliban Government assistance in retreating from Afghanistan.
October 2001
Numerous press reports indicate that Iran aids the retreat of hundreds
of al-Qaeda and Taliban members from Afghanistan. Some
al-Qaeda operatives enjoy safehaven in Iran to this day. Among
them is Said al-Adel, who is reportedly the third highest ranking
member of al-Qaeda and was trained by Hezbollah during the
early 1990s, and Saad bin Laden, Osama’s heir apparent.
April 11, 2002
Al-Qaeda carries out the first attack ordered by bin Laden since
9/11: a suicide bomber destroys a synagogue in Tunisia, killing
nineteen people. According to NBC News, Saad bin Laden contacted
the cell responsible for the attack from his safehaven in
Iran. Suleiman Abu Ghaith, bin Laden’s spokesman, also claims
al-Qaeda’s responsibility for the attack from his abode in Iran.
End of 2002 - Spring 2003
According to former Director of Central Intelligence George
Tenet, senior al-Qaeda leaders discuss the acquisition of nuclear
weapons from their safe haven in Iran. In fact, al-Qaeda’s “nuclear
chief,” Abdel al-Aziz al-Masri, is one of many senior terrorists living
in Iran.
May 12, 2003
Under orders from Saif al-Adel and Saad bin Laden, who are operating
from Iran, al-Qaeda’s terrorists simultaneously strike three
separate housing complexes in Riyadh Saudi Arabia. Another al-
Qaeda agent thought to be responsible for the attack flees to Iran
before he can be captured.
May 16, 2003
One dozen al-Qaeda bombers attack several targets in Casablanca,
Morocco. Saad bin Laden, living in Iran, is reportedly in contact
with the cell shortly before the attack.
2004 – present
Iran supplies advanced IED technology to the insurgents in Iraq.
There is growing evidence of Iranian support for both Sunni and
Shiite insurgency groups in Iraq. Iran continues to harbor senior
al-Qaeda leaders as the terrorist network reorganizes.
January 20, 2007
IRGC and Hezbollah terrorists kill five American soldiers in Karbala,
Iraq
January 2007 – present
Numerous IRGC and Hezbollah terrorists, who are responsible
for arming and training terrorist groups in Iraq, are captured by
American and Iraqi forces.

No, Mr. Krugman you're the one who's delusional. We need to fight back and we need to fight back now.

Zarqawi, Global Terror and Iran

One of the most insightful commentators on the current conflict has been Michael Ledeen, who, while not always advocating the correct means, seems to understand the problem we are facing more clearly than most. In his latest essay he comments:

Zarqawi was a very important man in the terror network. I first noticed him some years ago, reading the German and Italian press. Several terrorist cells in those countries had been rounded up, and court documents showed that in both countries the network had been created from Tehran, by Zarqawi. Thus, years before we went into Iraq, Zarqawi was already a major player in international terrorism, and in recognition of his skills he was sent into Iraq as one of the organizers of the terror war against us and the Iraqi people.

As usual, the connection to Iran is not evident in most reports on this murderer, though perhaps this is because it seems difficult to see how Iran would want to work with such an explicit hater of Shi'ites. Yet, Ledeen points out

Despite his intonations against the Shiites, and his manifest efforts to promote civil war in Iraq, Zarqawi was happy to work with the radical Shiite regime in Tehran, and they were happy to work with him. It is quite wrong to view him as a leader of one faction in a religious war; his promotion of religious conflict was simply a tactic designed to destabilize Iraq and drive out the Coalition. He and his Iranian backers/masters were desperate to promote all manner of internal Iraqi conflict: Kurds against Arabs, Turkamen against Kurds, anything that worked. It’s The Godfather all over again: the terror masters put aside their differences, sat down around the table, and made a war plan in which Sunni and Shia, Syrian and Saudi, Iranian and Iraqi cooperated against their common satanic enemy, the United States.

Although his recent pronouncements against Iran's leader and Hezbollah make me wonder whether the Iranians perhaps decided that he had outlived his usefulness. Nevertheless, before his untimely death he appears to have been quite busy (though fortunately unsuccessful):

Reports from Canada recount contacts between the ‘home-grown’ terrorists arrested by the Mounties and Zarqawi himself (See the ‘Mississauga News,’ June 7: ‘The arrest of 17 suspects...is said to be the latest stage in dismantling a terrorist network that’s linked to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi...’). Those arrests seem linked to those carried out in Atlanta, Georgia, by the FBI, and to other arrests in Sarajevo, England, and Denmark. It will be surprising if we don’t find Zarqawi’s claw prints in several of those venues, as the Canadians have said. Remember, it was publicly announced a few months ago that Zarqawi was no longer the head of al Qaeda in Iraq, that henceforth the Iraqi Sunni ‘community’ would run the terror war there, and that Zarqawi would devote his efforts to the international jihad. It seems he did just that — and failed.

Michael Ledeen is one of the few analysts who sees through the complexity of the terrorists world and argues that

we should conceive of terrorism as a kind of galaxy, with numerous components — ranging from Hamas and Islamic Jihad to the rump of al Qaeda and, most importantly, Hezbollah — who worked together, organized a division of labor, and were held in their orbits and epicycles by the Iranian intelligence apparatus, from the official ministry to the specialized units in the Revolutionary Guards.

Sadly we are still wasting time treating the Iranians with kid-gloves when open warfare has long been overdue. As the elimination of Zarqawi shows, this war is winnable, these murderers are not invincible, our military is more than capable of destroying them. All that is required is that we commit ourselves to American self-defense.

Various

Bush vs. Kerry
During the September 30, 2004 Presidential debate, Presidential candidate John Kerry said the following:

KERRY: With respect to Iran, the British, French, and Germans were the ones who initiated an effort without the United States, regrettably, to begin to try to move to curb the nuclear possibilities in Iran. I believe we could have done better. I think the United States should have offered the opportunity to provide the nuclear fuel, test them, see whether or not they were actually looking for it for peaceful purposes. If they weren't willing to work a deal, then we could have put sanctions together. The president did nothing. [emphasis added]

Headline today: U.S. to give Iran nuclear technology. From the article:

A package of incentives presented Tuesday to Iran includes a provision for the United States to supply Tehran with some nuclear technology if it stops enriching uranium — a major concession by Washington, diplomats said.
...
The package was agreed on last week by the United States, Britain, France, China and Russia — the five veto-wielding members of the U.N. Security Council, plus Germany, in a bid to resolve the nuclear standoff with Iran.

No comment necessary.

Brian Simpson's Markets Don't Fail!
My review of this useful book is posted at Nick Provenzo's Rule of Reason.

Tara Smith's Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics: The Virtuous Egoist
Last week I completed my reading of this excellent book which covers the Objectivist virtues including rationality, honesty, independence, integrity, justice, productiveness, and pride in detail. Despite the steep price for the hard cover, the book is well worth it since it covers material otherwise only available in far more expensive audio lectures. Among the more interesting topics covered are discussions of temperance, charity, kindness, and generosity, and their relationship to the usual Objectivist virtues, as well as to why the subject of individual rights does not fall under the purview of the virtue of justice (hint -- individual rights are not a matter of desert).